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Sociocultural Mediators of Remembering: 
An Extension of Bartlett’s Method of Repeated Reproduction 
 
 
Abstract 
The reported research uses an extension of Bartlett’s method of repeated reproduction 
to provide data on the sociocultural processes underlying reconstructive remembering. 
Twenty participants worked in pairs to remember the War of the Ghosts story 15 
minutes and one week after presentation. The observed transformations were 
comparable to previous research with individuals. Going beyond previous research, we 
analyse participants’ discourse to provide a window on the processes underlying these 
transformations. Textual excerpts demonstrate how imagery, narrative coherence, 
deduction, repetition, gesture, questioning and deferring contribute to the transformation 
and conventionalization of the material. These diverse sociocultural mediators are 
integrated into a partially coherent recollection by participants self-reflecting, or as 
Bartlett termed it, turning around upon their schemas. We demonstrate that this self-
reflection is both a social and a psychological process, occurring because participants 
are responding to their own utterances in the same way that they respond to the 
utterances of other people. These empirical findings are used to make a case for using 
discursive data to look not only at discursive processes, but also at socially situated and 
scaffolded psychological processes. 
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Sociocultural Mediators of Remembering:  
An Extension of Bartlett’s Method of Repeated Reproduction 
 
 
 
Bartlett’s (1932) book Remembering: A study in experimental and social 
psychology is celebrated by cognitive psychology (Baddeley, Eysenck & Anderson, 
2009) and discursive psychology (Middleton and Edwards, 1987). Cognitive psychology 
views Bartlett as demonstrating that the products of remembering are often distorted, 
focusing on the cognitive factors that lead to inaccuracy (e.g. Bergman & Roediger, 
1999). Related studies here have compared individual remembering to conversational 
remembering and found that nominal groups (where individual scores are pooled) 
remember more than real groups because social processes can inhibit cognition 
(Weldon & Bellinger, 1997).  Discursive psychology, on the other hand, has focused on 
the communicative pragmatics of conversational remembering.  Edwards and Middleton 
(1986a) have shown how experimental contexts of remembering encourage rationally 
ordering events, while everyday contexts encourage focusing on evaluations and 
emotional reactions. In another study, they found that text has very different 
communicative conventions than talk, which leads them to believe that some of the 
transformations reported by Bartlett (1932) are an effect of text conventions (e.g. for 
narrative coherence) rather than cognitive processes (Edwards & Middleton, 1986b).  
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 Split between cognitive and discursive approaches, Bartlett’s own integrative 
view of remembering has become fractured. Some recent approaches have begun to 
reconnect the different aspects of Bartlett’s legacy, such as extended and distributed 
cognition (e.g., Sutton, Harris, Keil, & Barnier, 2010). The present article welcomes 
these new efforts and advances this integration by offering a sociocultural extension of 
one of Bartlett’s key experiments, with the aim of producing an analysis which 
simultaneously emphasises cognitive, social and cultural processes (Bruner, 1990; 
Cole, 1996).  
 
Bartlett’s Incomplete Theory of Remembering 
Bartlett (1932) argued that remembering is reconstructive. He criticised 
Ebbinghaus’ (1885/1913) use of nonsense syllables for assuming that memory is a 
cognitive storehouse without regard for meaning. In contrast, Bartlett argued that 
remembering involves an ‘effort after meaning’. He asked English participants to 
remember meaningful narratives, such as the Native American folk-story War of the 
Ghosts, after increasing time delays. Qualitative single case analyses revealed that 
participants transformed the story towards a conventional English story, with 
supernatural elements being rationalized.  
To theorize these results Bartlett (1932) developed the concept of schema, which 
he defined as “an active organization of past reactions, or of past experiences […] 
which have been serially organized, yet which operate, not simply as individual 
members coming one after another, but as a unitary mass” (p. 201). In short, schemata 
are experiential or behavioural sequences, originating in past experiences, but adapting 
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to novel contexts (Wagoner, 2014). For example, the squirrel jumping from one branch 
to another is acting through past experience, yet each jump is unique, adapting to 
peculiarities of the given branches. Many human schemata, like narrative templates, are 
social in origin. Thus, group conventions play a key role in memory reconstruction. 
Because these schemata are brought from the past to a novel context they have a 
tendency to ‘conventionalize’ novelty, that is, to make the unfamiliar familiar. Bartlett, 
however, never demonstrated the actual processes through which schemas transform 
the to-be-remembered narrative. 
Bartlett’s “theory of remembering” (1932, p. 205 ff) emphasised the human ability 
to turn around upon and reflect on imagery. Rudimentary remembering is “simply the 
maintenance of a few ‘schema’, each of which has its natural and essential time order” 
(p. 205). However, in humans’ higher-order remembering, the schema becomes “not 
merely something that works the organism, but something with which the organism can 
work” (p. 206). He describes this as the organisms’ “capacity to turn around upon its 
own ‘schemata’ and to reconstruct them afresh” (p. 206). The problem is that Bartlett 
could not explain this capacity to turn around upon a schema, writing: “I wish I knew 
exactly how this is done” (p. 206). Unsurprisingly this aspect of his theory was widely 
criticised (Oldfield & Zangwill, 1942, p. 122; Wolters, 1933, p. 139; Gauld & 
Stephenson, 1967, p. 48).   
The present article has two aims. First, we will use sociocultural psychology to 
analyse the process of reconstructive remembering in terms of sociocultural mediators 
and turning around upon ones schema. Second, we will introduce an extension of 
Bartlett’s method of repeated reproduction which will enable us to achieve the first aim. 
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Contributions from Sociocultural Psychology 
 
Sociocultural psychology shares with discursive psychology a sensitivity to the 
role of social context in remembering, a focus on everyday talk, and critique of 
decontextualized and individualizing research (Cole, 1996; Shweder, 1991). However, 
unlike discursive psychology, it shares with cognitive psychology a focus on 
psychological processes, especially how they are shaped by social processes (Valsiner, 
2007). The sociocultural approach can make contributions to the two incomplete 
aspects of Bartlett’s theory. 
First, the sociocultural concept of mediation is used to conceptualise the way in 
which cultural artefacts (objects, practices and symbolic forms) are used in cognition 
(Zittoun, Gillespie, Cornish & Psaltis, 2007). The concept of mediation was first 
developed by Vygotsky (1995), who argued that all higher mental functions begin as 
actual relations between people and only later become cognitive processes within the 
child. For example, language between people becomes internalised by children, 
enabling them to talk themselves through problems (Fernyhough & Fradley, 2005). In 
development, psychological processes come to be increasingly mediated by cultural 
resources (tools, discourses, norms, representations, books, ideals, etc.) which are 
taken over directly from ones social group. Thus human cognition is distributed, with the 
social environment (people and cultural artifacts) scaffolding and augmenting human 
cognition (see also Sutton, Harris, Keil and Barnier, 2010; Hirst and Manier, 2008). 
Sociocultural mediators of remembering in contemporary society include a wide 
range of technologies, such as diaries and smartphones. In Bartlett’s experiment, 
however, participants only had access to symbolic resources. Bartlett (1932) himself 
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mentions narrative expectation, self-questioning and imagery as crucial to 
remembering. More recent research has further explored the role of narrative templates 
(Wertsch, 2002) and gesture (McNeill, 1996), and adds that within social situations, 
repetition (Rubin, 1996), questioning (Linell, 2009), and deferring to the other (Edwards 
& Middleton, 1987) can also play a role in mediating remembering. The following 
research attempts to empirically identify these mediators. 
Second, turning around upon ones schema was central to Bartlett’s “theory of 
remembering” (1932, p. 205 ff), but, as his critics argued, he was not clear on what it 
meant. We define it as a self-reflective shift of perspective, such that people end up 
reacting to and evaluating their own recollection. It is indicated by utterances such as 
‘but,’ ‘however,’ and ‘or’ and also be hesitations such as ‘I think,’ ‘maybe,’ and ‘I am not 
sure.’ It is an evaluative process which weaves together the emerging recollection. 
Turning round upon ones schema is thus a higher-order mediation of the more basic 
mediators such as imagery, deduction, narrative templates etc.  
The contribution of sociocultural psychology to turning round upon ones schema 
comes from Mead (1934). Mead conceptualized self-reflection as people responding to 
their own utterances in the same way that they respond to the utterances of others 
(Gillespie, 2007). This insight is important because makes the cognitive process of self-
reflection, or turning round upon ones schema, comprehensible as a social process. 
Specifically, it might be people interacting with their own utterances. 
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Speaking: A Window on Cognitive, Social and Cultural Processes 
Bartlett’s method of repeated reproduction was innovative. Individual participants 
reproduced material at increasing time delays, with reproductions revealing not only the 
absence of elements but also the transformation of elements. Thus Bartlett had 
evidence on a series of outcomes of reconstructive remembering, but limited evidence 
on the actual process. Bartlett was aware of this limitation and often asked participants 
about the process of remembering (Edwards & Middleton, 1987, p. 87; see also Bartlett, 
1936, p. 42). While interviewing participants undoubtedly gave Bartlett insights, self-
report on psychological or social processes is problematic (Lyons, 1983). 
Our methodological innovation has been to ask participants to complete a 
repeated reproduction task in dyads, this encourages them to converse naturally, and 
thus provides a window on the ‘black box’ between input and output (Moscovici, 1991). 
We assume that participants’ conversation provides clues about the social, cultural and 
cognitive mediators of remembering. It is acknowledged that discourse can reveal social 
processes (Brown & Middleton, 2005) and cultural processes, such as cultural 
narratives (Wertsch, 2002); however, using discourse to reveal psychological processes 
is more contentious (Ericsson & Simon, 1998). 
The idea that speaking can provide a window on psychological processes is 
longstanding (Mead, 1934; Marková, 2003; Merleau-Ponty,1945/1962, p. 180). Two 
conceptualizations are evident (Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010). First, is the idea that what is 
said is sometimes a direct expression of thought, as with a spontaneous expletive (e.g. 
Werner and Kaplan, 1963; Valsiner, 2003). Second, is the idea that speaking and 
cognition sometimes form part of a ‘thinking loop.’ This idea is evident in Vygotsky and 
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Luria’s (1994) observation that young children are better able to solve some tasks when 
they talk themselves through the task.  
We are not the first to use the method of repeated reproduction with dyads, or to 
study the discourse of those dyads. Middleton and Edwards (1990) used a similar 
method to analyse conversational remembering. Accuracy is just one of many things 
being achieved in conversations, and often social relations, equality of participation, and 
telling a good story take precedence (Edwards & Middleton, 1986a, 1986b). Thus 
schema, rather than coming from an individual, are negotiated discourse conventions 
within a particular setting (Middleton & Brown, 2005).  While we are enthusiastic about 
identifying these social processes, our aim in the following research is to exploit the 
discursive data further, so as to also provide insights into the sociocultural mediators of 
remembering. 
 
Methodology 
Participants. Twenty native English speaking students (ages 18-32) from the 
University of Cambridge were paired into 10 dyads. Each dyad was based on a pre-
existing friendship. 
Procedure. The experiment consisted of two reproductions of the Native 
American story The War of the Ghosts, the first after 15 minutes and the second after 
one week. The procedure followed Bartlett (1932) and is broadly the same as Bergman 
and Roediger (1999). Participants were given a sheet with the story typed on it and 
instructed “to read the story twice at regular speed”. After they had finished reading 
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participants filled out a short demographic questionnaire and worked on a distractor task 
comprising easy mathematics problems.  
Both Gauld and Stephenson (1967) and Bergman and Roediger (1999) reported 
a quantitative difference in recall between lenient and strict reproduction instructions. 
The present study used intermediate instructions. A scribe was randomly assigned, 
given a lined sheet of paper and the following instructions were read: 
As a pair discuss and write down the story you read earlier as accurately as 
possible. If you decide to change what you have already written, put a single line 
through the portion you want to delete and rewrite your correction next to the 
deleted portion.  
 
Data. The procedure yielded two data sets. First, we collected the written 
reproductions for each dyad in each trial in order to establish comparability with 
previous studies. Second, all the conversations of the dyads producing the written 
reproductions were audio recorded and fully transcribed. Table 1 provides an overview 
of the conversation data. There was considerable variability between dyads in terms of 
how much discussion occurred, but there did not seem to be any important differences 
on average between Trial 1 and Trial 2. 
 
-- Insert table 1 here -- 
 
Method for Scoring the Reproductions. Bergman and Roediger’s (1999) 
scoring procedure was used. The original story was divided into 42 idea propositions 
(originally proposed by Mandler & Johnson, 1977). For each proposition in the original, 
we tried to identify a corresponding proposition in the reproduction. When one was 
found it was coded as accurate or distorted. Distortion implies a change of meaning 
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(i.e., not just rephrasing). We agree with Edwards and Potter (1992) that focusing 
exclusively on accuracy and distortion is problematic. However, we maintain that it does 
provide an accessible and transparent entry point into the data, providing comparability 
with previous studies.  
Method for Coding the Discourse. The data was coded for sociocultural 
mediators of remembering, using template coding procedures (King, 1998). The list of 
codes does not claim to be exhaustive, but rather focuses on the intersection between 
mediators which have been reported in the literature and which were evident in the 
data. The list of codes and their respective justification is presented below. 
Imagery: Imagery was an important concept for Bartlett (1932). He 
conceptualised it as often something particular which participants would struggle to 
build their recollection around. Imagery is not simply mental, but it is closely connected 
with actions and gestures (McNeil, 1996). Imagery was operationalized in a narrow 
manner, by coding when participants explicitly referred to an image: “stuck in my head,” 
“clearly remember the phrase,” “all I remember is” and “sticking with my memory.”  
Narrative coherence: Narrative coherence has been a key component of 
remembering for many theorists (e.g., Bruner, 1990; Brockmeier, 2012) including 
Bartlett. It was particularly evident when participants organised their recollection on the 
basis of what “must have been” the case. But we also found narrative coherence 
working at a deeper level, providing templates (Wertsch, 2002), which selected and 
conventionalized what was remembered.  
Deduction: Deduction is quite similar to narrative coherence, in the sense that 
both seek some sort of logical or narrative closure. The difference is that deduction 
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seeks coherence on the basis of logic or common sense not on the basis of the 
emerging narrative. However, there were ambiguous cases that could have either been 
coded as narrative coherence or deduction.     
Repetition: Repetition refers to individual or dyads repeating the same word or 
utterance two or more times. This is often done with a degree of rhythm, which has 
been linked to greater memorability (Rubin, 1996). Moreover, repetition seems to have 
the function of focusing attention, possibly by keeping the salient element in working 
memory or the auditory loop. 
Gesturing: Gesturing refers to participants slapping hands, banging tables, or 
otherwise gesticulating in a way that might aid remembering. The role of gestures in 
cognitive processes has been insightfully demonstrated by McNeill (1996), who has 
illustrated how thinking, speaking and gesturing are tightly coordinated and mutually 
reinforcing.   
Questioning: Questioning can serve many functions, including, introducing a 
suggestion, beginning a disagreement, focusing attention, or attempting to trigger some 
recollection. Questions can also be directed at the other or self. Indeed, it is not 
uncommon in the data for people to answer their own questions. Such instances, we 
suggest, are illustrations of the dialogicality of the human mind (Linell, 2009), where 
participants are interrogating their own feelings of recollection. 
Deferring: Deferring refers to disagreements which result in one participant 
accepting to go with the other participant’s recollection. As both Bartlett (1932, p. 96) 
and Edwards and Middleton (1987) observed, sometimes accuracy is a second priority 
to the demands of social relations. 
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Results and Analysis 
 
Table 2 reports our data scored using Bergman and Roediger’s (1999) protocol. 
The ‘proportion of errors’ refers to the number of distorted propositions divided by the 
total number of propositions. Despite the conversational nature of the task, which likely 
contributed to create a more informal atmosphere (see also Middleton & Edwards, 
1990), the results suggest that our data is broadly comparable to the data from 
individuals in previous studies. Moreover, our data on distortions replicates the basic 
finding that remembering is not simply forgetting (i.e., getting less accurate), but an 
active reconstructive process which transformed 41% of the propositions. 
 
-- Insert table 2 here -- 
 
Table 3 explores the sociocultural mediators underlying the observed 
transformations. Frequency, we suspect, is a misleading indicator of importance. For 
example, rhythmic gesture was the least frequent mediator, but this is possibly because 
it is difficult to identify in the audio data. Questions, in contrast, are particularly evident 
in audio data (because they tend to be verbal). This is to say that our data is an 
incomplete and selective window on psychological processes (Werner & Kaplan, 1963).  
 
-- Insert table 3 here -- 
 
The following sub-sections explore how the sociocultural mediators lead to the 
observed transformations (or ‘distortions’ in Bergman and Roediger’s terminology). The 
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presentation follows two dyads that have been selected to illustrate the range of 
sociocultural mediations observed. They are presented in a narrative form so that the 
reader can understand each dyad contextually.  
Imagery and deferring to the other. The first excerpt comes from participants 
who we will call Nick and Ellen. It is their first reproduction and they are trying to recall 
the opening sentences of the story. 
 
Excerpt 1 
 
The original text: 
One night two young men from Egulac went down to the river to hunt seals and 
while they were there it became foggy and calm. Then they heard war-cries, and 
they thought: "Maybe this is a war-party". They escaped to the shore, and hid 
behind a log. 
 
Participants’ written reproduction: 
One night they went down to the river to fish. 
 
Participants’ dialogue: 
47 
48 
Nick: [Writing down what has been agreed] One night [writing] went down 
to the river to fish [finished writing] 
49 
50 
51 
Ellen: Yep, hmmm, I seem to think that they were hiding or something but I 
can’t remember. They were, I have this image of them sort of 
crouching down [Ellen moves her body as if crouching] 
52 Nick: Yeah 
53 Ellen: Next to the log 
54 Nick: Yeah 
55 Ellen: You know sitting there but I may have just imagined 
56 Nick: I didn’t pick that up 
57 Ellen: No, I probably imagined it then 
   
 
Many scholars have identified imagery as central to remembering (Bartlett, 1932; 
Rubin, 1996; Yates, 1974). Imagery is not simply abstract mental imagery, but also an 
embodied and action-oriented feeling. Ellen (line 51) illustrates this because she does 
not simply have a mental image of “crouching” but she crouches in a spontaneous 
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gesture (McNeil, 1996). Interestingly, this imagery is not in the form that Ellen 
encountered it (i.e., as written text about someone else); it has become a first-person 
perspective embodied identification.  
Bartlett (1932, p. 208-216) wrote that visual imagery had a particularizing 
function, providing a check on the generalizing tendency of schema. Given this function, 
Bartlett theorized that when imagery arose it would often be disconnected from other 
material and often difficult to integrate (Bartlett, 1932, chapter 11). The above quotation 
illustrates this: neither Nick nor Ellen is able to link her image to their emerging 
recollection. 
Ellen tries to integrate the image, elaborating and rephrasing it (“hiding,” 
“crouching,” “next to the log,” and “sitting there”) but the integration fails: “but I may have 
just imagined.” The “but” indicates, as Mead (1934) observed, a change of perspective. 
Ellen turns round upon her schema and questions its validity, illustrating, as Bartlett 
(1932, p. 206) had observed that humans are not “dominated,” or trapped within, their 
schema. Nick supports Ellen’s doubt in the imagery, thus encouraging Ellen to 
consolidate her doubt and defer (“I probably imagined it then”). 
Imagery and narrative coherence. In Excerpt 2, line 58, Ellen continues by 
remembering an approaching boat. This leads to some confusion about what the 
protagonists “heard” and what they “saw.” The idea of hiding returns to bring narrative 
coherence to these elements.  
 
Excerpt 2 
 
The original text: 
Then they heard war-cries, and they thought: “Maybe this is a war-party”. They 
escaped to the shore, and hid behind a log. Now canoes came up, and they 
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heard the noise of paddles, and saw one canoe coming up to them. 
 
Participants written reproduction: 
They heard a worrying noise so they hid. Soon a boat appeared 
 
Participants’ dialogue: 
58 Ellen: But the next, I can remember that they saw a boat 
59 Nick: But they heard something 
60 Ellen: They heard a noise 
61 Nick: They heard something and then they hid 
62 Ellen: They saw, they hid that was right that was - 
63 Nick:                                   - They heard something and then they hid 
64 Ellen: Yeah, so they heard some - 
65 
66 
Nick:                   - They heard a noise. What happened was it was 
terribly frightening or something because they hid 
67 Ellen: Yeah 
68 Nick: So what can we put for that? Heard a worrying noise? 
69 Ellen: Yeah 
70 Nick: I don’t know [both laugh] 
71 
72 
Ellen: That’s why I thought of him sort of crouching down. ‘Cause that’s 
why they were hiding 
 
Ellen and Nick repeat three actions (“saw”, “heard” and “hid”) in varying 
combinations. This seems to be done to hold the three actions in working memory, 
focusing their attention on them while trying out different narrative orderings. Maybe by 
repeating these elements Nick and Ellen hope to trigger related associations (see below 
on repetition). In this process what they “heard” becomes increasingly differentiated 
through the contribution of both participants: Nick’s “something” is changed to “noise” by 
Ellen, then Nick further specifies it as a “worrying noise” (line 68, which ends up in the 
written reproduction). This final change occurs as a result of Nick’s narrative integration: 
“what happened was it was terribly frightening or something because they hid”. Nick 
makes the action (hiding) understandable through an attribution (frightened). The 
moment of understanding is the moment of integration into a coherent narrative 
sequence, and no further repetition is required.  
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The narrative coherence of hearing a worrying noise turns Ellen’s previous 
embodied image of “crouching” and “sitting” into the narratively coherent action “hiding” 
because it was a “terribly frightening” noise. Ellen’s embodied imagery previously 
disconnected from the recollection can now be integrated into the narrative which is 
causally woven in the temporality of human action (Ricoeur, 1990).  
Gesture and questioning. Turning to Ellen and Nick’s second reproduction of 
the first few lines of the story, we see, in Excerpt 3, that they are again struggling to 
integrate fragmented images. Again the key words are “saw” and “heard.” Now it is the 
idea that the protagonists “thought” something which sticks - possibly because, as 
established in the first reproduction, it is the thought that ghosts are approaching which 
leads to hiding. What we want to draw attention to, however, is how Nick uses questions 
and rhythmic gesture to differentiate and sequence these initially unintegrated images. 
 
Excerpt 3 
  
The original text: 
Then they heard war-cries, and they thought: “Maybe this is a war-party”. They 
escaped to the shore, and hid behind a log. 
 
Written reproduction: 
They heard a noise, and saw some canoes approaching. They hid as they 
feared it the canoes contained ghosts, who were going to make war.   
 
Participants’ dialogue: 
32 Ellen: They heard a noise and the canoes approaching 
33 Nick: Yeah, it was caa- anything happen before that? 
34 Ellen: I don’t think 
35 
36 
37 
38 
Nick: All right, so they hea- no, did the- did they think before they saw 
something, they thought it was someth- Did they think [pounds fist 
on table] before they saw anything? [pounds fist on table] They 
thought ‘oh, it may be ghosts’ 
39 
40 
Ellen: I thought that was after they saw the canoes coming. They said, 
‘Oh it might be ghosts in the canoes’. 
41 Nick: Yeah, before they saw? So it was like they heard [pounds fist], they 
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42 thought [pounds fist] and then they saw? 
 
Nick and Ellen are talking passed each other. Nick’s question (line 33), “anything 
happen before that?” calls out his own answer. He first follows Ellen’s utterance in 
remembering the scene (“all right, so they hea-”), but cuts off by returning to his 
question (“no, did the- did they think”). This truncated and repeated question is less an 
effort to communicate or describe; it is better understood as an expression of Nick’s 
own unfolding stream of thought. It has the characteristics of inner speech identified by 
Werner and Kaplan (1963, p. 322-324), namely ellipsis, syntactic incompleteness, the 
confluence of diverse meanings, and more connotation than denotation. His utterances 
also comprise deictic words, filled with personal sense (e.g., “anything,” “before that,” 
“they”, “something,” and “it”). This looping back and repetition seems to focus Nick’s 
attention on an unarticulated idea which is pregnant in his hesitation and questioning. 
The answer begins to emerge in line 36 (“they thought it was someth”), but again 
he interrupts himself to ask a more refined question. He asks, “did they think before they 
saw anything?” and his gesture of pounding the table twice coincides with the 
differentiation of “think” from “saw”. The answer to the question (“they thought ‘oh, it 
may be ghosts’”) suggests that this thought must have occurred before anything was 
seen. In lines 41-42, the elements of the narrative and differentiated and integrated 
once again accompanied by pounding the table: “they heard [pounds fist], they thought 
[pounds fist], and then they saw.” In this case embodied gestures are not linked to the 
content of what is remembered (e.g., Ellen’s “crouching”), but to help organise the 
process of remembering, specifically, the differentiation and integration of images in the 
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unfolding of schema. The gestures help to differentiate an otherwise vague feeling that 
there was “something.” 
The excerpt illustrates the possibility of capturing spontaneous thinking in 
discursive data and opens up questions about the parallels between inter- and intra-
psychological processes (Larrain & Haye, 2012). The parallel is that both involve 
responding to speech, produced by self or other; the major difference seems to be that 
speech responding to self takes a different, more truncated, form (Werner & Kaplan, 
1963). This excerpt also illustrates, yet again, the embodied nature of cognition, where 
quite physical gestures (pounding the table) are part of the process through which 
vague feelings become differentiated recollections. 
Deduction and repetition. The next three excerpts are from participants we will 
call Bill and Henry. Their interaction was unusually tense and short, yet they recalled 
slightly more than average. Excerpt 4 begins after they have agreed that the two 
protagonists were “hunting seals” and they are unsure what comes next. 
 
Excerpt 4 
 
The original text: 
and while they were there it became foggy and calm 
 
Written reproduction: 
It becomes foggy and calm 
 
Participants’ dialogue: 
6 
7 
Bill: Hunting seals. Two guys hunting seals [writing]. Ok, so there are 
two guys hun- 
8 
9 
10 
Henry:             -You know what I just realized? They must have had to club 
the seals because remember later in the story they don’t have any 
arrows. You know what I mean? 
11 Bill: All right, two guys hunting seals, ahhmm, 
12 Henry: And why were there seals there? 
13 Bill: They go down to the- 
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14 Henry:                         -They hear some noises 
15 Bill: No, no, no, no, no. Oh my God this is painful. 
16 Henry: Well, I’m not good; I don’t have a good memory 
17 
18 
Bill: Ahhhhh! So, the two guys are hunting seals, da, da, da, da. It 
becomes foggy and calm, right? 
 
Henry deduces, based on what is agreed (hunting seals), that the protagonists 
must have had “to club” the seals (lines 8-10). He justifies this deduction by appealing to 
a recollection that the protagonists do not have any arrows. Bill ignores Henry, and 
Henry precedes his speculative thoughts to include the seals (line 12). Again, Bill 
ignores Henry and tries to repeat what is established, but eventually he erupts: “no, no, 
no, no, no. Oh my God this is painful” (line 15). The interaction is “painful” for Bill 
because Henry’s suggestions interfere with Bill’s own efforts to remember.  
Bill’s strategy, in the face of distraction, is repetition. Bill repeats the one phrase 
he is confident in four times (“Two guys hunting seals”, “two guys hun”, “two guys 
hunting seals”, and “the two guys are hunting seals”). This repetition could serve three 
functions. First, it might be an attempt to occupy the airwaves and prevent Henry from 
speaking. Second, it might help to focus Bill’s attention in the context of distracting 
suggestions. Third, it is as if he is repeatedly evoking what is known in the hope that it 
will trigger, by association, the subsequent element. It is as if he is repeatedly charging 
at the unknown, hoping that the known will stimulate further schematic unfolding. These 
two functions likely work together, and seem to coalesce in the “da, da, da, da” (line 17) 
which both holds the floor (thus preventing another introjection from Henry) and also 
holds onto the thought of “hunting seals,” prolonging the feeling, which does indeed lead 
to the desired temporally associated phrase (“it becomes foggy and calm”). 
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Imagery, narrative coherence and questioning. In the following excerpt Bill 
and Henry are trying to recall the end of the story, and in so doing they introduce new 
elements to the story and also try to resolve the ambiguous ending. 
 
Excerpt 5 
 
The original text: 
He told it all, and then he became quiet. When the sun rose he fell down. 
Something black came out of his mouth. 
 
Written reproduction: 
People look at him strangely.  He became quiet after telling his story. He woke 
up. Something black came out of his mouth.   
 
Participants’ dialogue: 
93 
94 
Bill: He told his story and then became quiet. Right? And then the sun 
sets [pause] or something 
95 Henry: Well, he goes to sleep 
96 
97 
Bill: It didn’t say anything about sleep. In the morning he stood up and 
died 
98 Henry: Woke up and died 
99 
100 
101 
Bill: All right, so he became quite after telling the story. Ahh, a 
photographic memory would be awesome right now. Ok now 
we’re to the point where he woke up. Did they say he woke up? 
102 Henry:  I don’t think he stood up 
103 Bill: I thought he 
104 Henry: I don’t think he stood up. I think he did wake up 
105 Bill: Ok, so he woke up [writes]. Something black 
106 Henry: Came out of his mouth 
 
Bill and Henry are stuck trying to remember the phrase “When the sun rose he 
fell down”. They easily remember the elements before (“he told his story and then 
became quiet”) and after (“something black” “came out of his mouth”). But, the phrase in 
between is problematic. In their effort after meaning they speculate about sunsets, 
waking up, standing up, and sleeping. What is interesting is how these four new 
elements relate to either “the sun rose” or “he fell down.” 
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Bill suggests, with a question, that they became “quiet” and “the sun sets” (which 
is the logical precursor to the original “the sun rose”) but he turns on this schema and 
expresses uncertainty with “or something”. Henry puts forward another possibility (“he 
goes to sleep”) which conventionally occurs after the “sun sets” and which might be a 
transformation of “he fell down.” This possibility is rejected by Bill (line 96), who 
suggests that “in the morning he stood up” (standing up possibly being the precursor to 
falling down). Henry counter-suggests with a question (line 101) that “he woke up”, 
which synthesizes his original position (“he goes to sleep”) with Bill’s suggestion. This is 
done firstly by transforming “he goes to sleep” into its opposite (“woke up”), which has 
long been recognised as a common transition in thinking (Meinong, 1902/1983; 
Marková, 1987).  
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that metaphors arise out of an experiential 
grounding in the body-image. Bill and Henry have an embodied feeling for UP-DOWN. 
The problem is that this feeling leads to three potential up/down movements which get 
entangled, namely, sunrise/sunset, stand-up/fall-down, and wake-up/fall-asleep. Thus, 
from the phrase “the sun rose he fell down” what is remembered is not the details, but 
some embodied imagery, a broad orientating metaphor. Participants struggle because 
the element violates the cultural expectation that when the sun goes down people also 
go down (to sleep), and when the sun rises then people also rise. Accordingly, it is 
unsurprising that none of the dyads correctly recollected this element by the second 
reproduction. 
Excerpt 5 provides insight into the mechanisms underlying conventionalization. 
Bill and Henry fail to recollect the unfamiliar element, replacing it with something more 
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familiar. How does this occur? Suggestions based on an embodied up/down feeling are 
put forward, both directly and more hesitantly using questions. They then both evaluate 
these suggestions in terms of what feels familiar and coherent. But this evaluative step 
is grounded in their own cultural conventions, and as such, is predisposed to turning the 
unfamiliar into the familiar. In this case conventionalization occurs because familiar 
meanings are used both to generate suggestions and to evaluate those suggestions. 
Narrative templates from Hollywood. Narrative coherence can operate in very 
subtle ways. One peculiar novel element introduced in five of the ten dyads was that the 
protagonist was himself a ghost.  
 
Excerpt 6 
 
The original text: 
Something black came out of his mouth. His face became contorted. The people 
jumped up and cried. He was dead. 
 
Written reproduction: 
People look at him strangely.  He became quiet after telling his story. He woke 
up. Something black came out of his mouth.   
 
Participants’ dialogue: 
108 
109 
Henry: And everyone looked at him, strangely. No, remember people look 
at him strangely. 
110 Bill: When? 
111 
112 
Henry: Early, just before this because I remember when I was reading it 
the first time 
113 Bill: When he woke up? 
114 Henry:  No, no, yeah, I remember thinking that he was a ghost 
115 Bill: Ok, so when did they look at him strangely? 
 
Bill and Henry, in their written recollection, introduce a new element, namely, 
“people look at him strangely.” How does this new element end up in the written record? 
Henry introduces the idea (line 108) and he justifies it by reporting that he thought that 
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the protagonist was a ghost (line 114). The idea that the protagonist was a ghost never 
appeared in their written accounts, yet, the idea appears in the discourse, mediating 
recollections and producing new elements such as “people look at him strangely.” 
Bartlett (1917, 1920, 1928, 1932) never reported his participants suspecting that 
the protagonist was a ghost. So, where has this suddenly widespread element come 
from? One possibility is that participants were applying a narrative template borrowed 
from Hollywood movies (cf. Radstone, 2010) such as The Sixth Sense and The Others, 
in which there is a surprise ending where the audience realizes the protagonist is a 
ghost. Both of these films were popular in 2006, when the research was conducted, and 
follow up interviews revealed that the five participants who introduced this idea had 
seen at least one of these films.  
Introducing this “narrative template” (Wertsch, 2002, p. 60) makes otherwise 
unfamiliar elements of the Native Indian narrative familiar. In the Native American 
society, from which the story originates (see Boas, 1901), narrative templates for 
understanding what happens when one comes into contact with ghosts were readily 
accessible. English listeners, in contrast, struggle with their own ill-adapted conventions. 
According to participants’ conventions it does not makes sense that the Indian does not 
feel unwell when he is hit by an arrow, nor does it make sense that he would suddenly 
die. The new narrative template, that the protagonist is a ghost who is unaware that he 
is a ghost, organises these elements, making these elements meaningful.   
Turning Round Upon One’s Schema. How are the above mentioned 
sociocultural mediators woven together in remembering? Why are some mediations 
accepted while others are rejected? The mechanism suggested by Bartlett was turning 
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round upon one’s schema.  We operationalized this by examining instances when 
participants reflected upon their recollection, as indicated by words such as “but,” “or” 
and “however.”  
Turning round upon one’s schema is widespread in the data. Consider Excerpt 1, 
when Ellen says, “I seem to think they were hiding or something but I can’t remember” 
(lines 49-50). Here Ellen is both putting forward a recollection, and doubting it. Another 
example is in Excerpt 6 when Bill says “the sun sets [pause] or something” (lines 93-
94). Bill introduces an idea, and then turns upon it stating that something else might 
have happened. Additional instances can be found in Excerpt 1 (line 57), Excerpt 2 (line 
70), Excerpt 3 (line 35), Excerpt 4 (line 16), and Excerpt 5 (lines 93, 99-100). In each of 
these instances a participant begins to put forward a recollection, and then they turn 
upon that recollection, or schema, and evaluate it. These evaluations are usually 
hesitant (e.g., “I seem to think”) but sometimes they are more affirming (e.g., “I can 
remember” and “I remember”). 
Identifying the boundaries of turning round upon one’s schema proved to be 
difficult, mainly because it is often unclear whether the reflection is initiated by the 
speaker alone or the social interaction. For example, in Excerpt 1, when Ellen 
introduces the idea of the protagonists crouching, there is a mixture of her being 
hesitant (“sort of” line 50) and Nick not really taking up the idea (“Yeah”, lines 52 and 
54), which results in Ellen turning around upon the recollection (“I may have just 
imagined”, line 55). In such instances inter-personal and intra-psychological processes 
are not clearly separable. 
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Drawing upon the basic sociocultural insight that psychological processes such 
as self-reflection develop through social processes (Mead, 1934; Vygotksy & Luria, 
1994), we proceeded to examine instances where participants were turning around 
upon each other’s schema (i.e., commenting on or evaluating the recollections of their 
partner). We also found this to be widespread. One example is when Henry suggests 
that the protagonist “goes to sleep” and Bill responds “It didn’t say anything about sleep” 
(Excerpt 5, lines 95-96). In such cases a recollection is put forward, and it is turned 
upon and evaluated (usually rejected) by the conversation partner. Often the participant 
who put forward a recollection would accept or at least defer to the evaluative 
judgement, revealing the peculiar ease with which participants moved between turning 
round on their own and the other’s schema. 
While Bartlett (1932, p. 205 ff) was convinced that turning around upon a schema 
was central to constructive remembering, he was unable to propose a mechanism. 
Mead’s (1922, 1934; Gillespie, 2007) insight that people hear their own utterances in 
much the same way as they hear the utterances of others, can provide a mechanism. 
We argue that participants are reacting to their own utterances in the same way that 
they react to each other’s utterances. For example, Nick (Excerpt 3, line 35) asks a 
question, and then answers it himself. Nick, in the same utterance, also makes a 
suggestion and then responds to it (“no”). Accordingly, turning around upon ones 
schema is no more remarkable than responding to someone else’s schema. Such self-
reflection is both social and cognitive, with the externalised utterance, in the gaze of the 
other, being like a mirror which creates a reflection. 
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Discussion 
Bartlett (1932, p. 44) characterized remembering as an “effort after meaning.” But 
because his methodology focused upon outputs, the microgenetic processes involved in 
this reconstructive effort have been invisible (Wagoner, 2009). The present research 
has extended Bartlett’s research using dyads as a means to provide a window on the 
reconstructive process. As with previous research, we found widespread (41%) 
transformations (or ‘distortions’). A sociocultural analysis of participants’ discourse 
identified seven (question, repetition, deferring, imagery, coherence, deduction and 
rhythmic gesture) mediators underlying these transformations. 
Bartlett (1932) observed, on the basis of participants’ outputs, that unfamiliar 
material was conventionalized. Our data provides insight into how this actually occurs. 
Participants’ reconstructive remembering entails interrogating themselves and each 
other (questions, repetitions). There is a weaving together of prior experience and 
feelings of reading the story (imagery and rhythmic gesture) with familiar cultural 
expectations (narrative coherence and deduction). Generated suggestions are then 
evaluated in terms of what ‘feels’ right, a process which again privileges that which is 
familiar. This analysis chimes with the two-stage ‘generate-recognize’ model of 
recollection (Anderson & Bower, 1972; Higham & Tam, 2005), but adds empirical data 
to show that this process can be socially distributed (Cole & Engström, 1993). Because 
the process is social, being shaped or scaffolded by the other (Sutton, Harris, Keil, & 
Barnier, 2010), it is also mediated by more purely social processes, such as deferring to 
the view of the other. 
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The foregoing analysis also revives Bartlett’s (1932, p. 206) key concept of 
turning around upon ones schema. This concept has been widely criticised for having 
no evidence or mechanism (Olfield & Zangwill, 1942; Gauld & Johnston, 1967). Our 
data provides evidence for the phenomenon, and we have proposed that it might occur 
and develop through people responding to their own utterances in much the same way 
as they respond to other people’s utterances (Mead, 1922). The concept could be seen 
to be an ancestor of the subsequent research on meta-memory (Flavell, 1979), namely, 
the idea that people have both recollections and cognitions about those recollections 
(Nelson, 1996, p. 105). Although self-reflection can, of course, be a wholly intracranial 
process, our data indicates that it can also be scaffolded by social relations. Thus, while 
meta-memory has been studied as a cognitive capacity, our analysis, building upon 
Bartlett’s original approach, conceptualises it as a social psychological process. 
The foregoing analysis has been based upon a model of distributed remembering 
(Sutton, Harris, Keil & Barnier, 2010), focusing on the ways in which cognitive, social 
and cultural processes form an interactive coupling within a particular context. Using the 
discourse of dyads to provide a window on these diverse processes may be 
contentious. We do not appeal to philosophical arguments about the ontological status 
of mind to justify our approach, rather, we point to the outcomes of the analysis which 
reveals a complex and situated interplay between cognitive, cultural and social factors. 
There are doubtless important differences between intra-psychological processes and 
what people say (Werner & Kaplan, 1963; Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010), and accordingly 
any analysis needs to proceed with caution. However, all methodologies for studying 
psychological processes have limitations. If social psychologists dare to push beyond 
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an exclusively discursive interpretation of conversational data, they may find that they 
are in possession of a powerful methodology for studying the situated coupling of 
cognition, culture and social interaction. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Overview of the conversation data 
 
 Trial 1 (15 Minutes) Trial 2 (1 week) 
 Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
Duration in seconds 1272 726 597-2990 1050 443 540-2110 
Words spoken 2222 1123 775-3739 1943 944 707-3434 
 
 
Table 2: Mean proportions of propositions recalled accurately and with distortion 
 
 Recall Session 
First (15 min) Second (1 week) 
M SD M SD 
Bergman & Roediger  
(Individuals, strict instructions) 
    
     Accurate .26 .12 .12 .09 
     Distorted .33 .09 .37 .14 
     Proportion of errors .57 .12 .75 .19 
Bergman & Roediger  
(Individuals, lenient instructions) 
    
     Accurate .17 .10 .13 .08 
     Distorted .38 .10 .36 .10 
     Proportion of errors .69 .14 .75 .13 
Present study  
(Dyads, intermediate instructions) 
    
     Accurate .15 .10 .10 .08 
     Distorted .41 .11 .41 .11 
     Proportion of errors .75 .11 .82 .13 
 
 
Table 3: Sociocultural mediators of remembering 
 
 First Reproduction 
(15 minutes) 
Second Reproduction 
(1 week) 
Combined 
 Instances Number of 
dyads Instances 
Number of 
dyads Instances 
Number of 
dyads 
Question 175 10 251 10 426 20 
Repetition 68 10 80 10 148 20 
Deferring to the other 57 10 49 10 106 20 
Imagery 43 10 43 10 86 20 
Narrative coherence 30 9 43 9 73 20 
Deduction 22 8 50 8 72 18 
Rhythmic gesture 15 3 5 3 20 5 
 
 
 
